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A central challenge for any theory of concept learning comes from Fodor’s argument against
the learning of concepts, which lies at the basis of contemporary computationalist accounts
of the mind. Robert Goldstone and his colleagues propose a theory of perceptual learning
that attempts to overcome Fodor’s challenge. Its main component is the addition of a cog-
nitive device at the interface of perception and conception, which slowly builds “cognitive
symbols” out of perceptual stimuli. Two main mechanisms of concept creation are unitiza-
tion and differentiation. In this paper, I will present and examine their theory, and will show
that two problems hinder this reply to Fodor’s challenge from being a successful answer
to the challenge.To amend the theory, I will argue that one would need to say more about
the input systems to unitization and differentiation, and be clearer on the representational
format that they are able to operate upon. Until these issues have been addressed, the
proposal does not deploy its full potential to threaten a Fodorian position.
Keywords: concept learning, perceptual learning, computationalism
Cognitive psychology has recently seen the development of several
newmodels positing a perceptual basis for conceptual systems. The
panoply of views ranges from proposals to eliminate the distinc-
tion between concepts and percepts altogether (Barsalou, 1999)
over more modest appraisals of the relations between the two
(Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998) to proposals for the creation of
cognitive processes through experience with perceptual stimuli
(Schyns and Rodet, 1997). As one important contribution to this
line of research, Robert Goldstone’s perceptual learning approach
stands out and shall be at the center of our present investigation
in the links between the perceptual and the conceptual.
Among the speciﬁc questions related to perception and learn-
ing, Goldstone and his colleagues and collaborators discuss the
possibility and mechanisms of perceptual learning (Goldstone,
1998), the inﬂuence of perception on categorization (Landy and
Goldstone, 2005), the role of features of objects in categorization
(Schyns et al., 1998), and learning in early ontogeny (Goldstone
et al., 2011). Their target is the more conservative ﬁxed-feature
approach – a form of computationalism, which holds that new
concepts are constructed by using pre-existent, cognitively ﬁxed
features. One avid defender of this view is Fodor (1975, 1981,
2008), whose classic argument against concept learning especially
affects perceptually based“empiricist” theories. The upshot of this
argument is that learning concepts needs to be based on a vocab-
ulary in which hypotheses about these concepts are formulated.
But that vocabulary itself already needs to contain the concept
that is just being “learned.” Fodor infers from this that all con-
cepts must be innate, or at least not learned. In what follows, I
will call this “Fodor’s Challenge for theories of concept learning.”
Taking its conclusion as an undesirable outcome for any theorist
who wants to maintain a notion of genuine learning, one might
ask the following question.
Assuming that cognition is at least a partly computational
process, is there any way of having new symbols from perceptual
origins entering the internal symbol system?AsGoldstone answers
this to the afﬁrmative, I will discuss his proposal and point out two
problems with it that need more consideration.
FODOR’S CHALLENGE FOR THEORIES OF CONCEPT
LEARNING
In order to see where Goldstone and colleagues aim when they
criticize the ﬁxed feature position, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy set out this
position and the challenge it poses to research in perceptual learn-
ing. Fodor goes through the following steps to reach the conclusion
that concepts, and by that also features, cannot be learned.
First, Fodor construes learning mechanisms as“rational–causal
processes”(Fodor,1981,p. 273) –Being a rational process, learning
is mediated by psychological states, such as beliefs. Also, regarding
the possible constituents of thought, Fodor argues that what is not
learned is innate or acquired in some other non-rational way.
A further premise of his argument concerns possession condi-
tions for concepts: “A sufﬁcient condition for having the concept
C is: being able to think about something as (a) C” (Fodor, 2008,
p. 138, original emphasis.). This means that the main act of con-
cept use is using the concept in forming beliefs (or other types
of thoughts) – as contrasted with using the concept to categorize
new sensory experiences, or to act upon a thing in the world. For
Fodor, thinking is prior to perceiving and acting in the order of
concept use.
Now, from this position one needs to have a model of how a
concept can enter this realm of thought. Fodor argues that the
only available, empirically tested model for learning is the follow-
ing: learning the concept C consists in forming hypotheses about
C and testing them against the available evidence. Thus, learning
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is a process of inductive inference. Forming a hypothesis about the
concept C requires bringing the property expressed by C before
one’s mind. One needs to think about a piece of evidence“x”as (a)
C to (dis-)conﬁrm the hypothesis about C. To learn which things
are green, one must judge something to be (or not be) green. This
act of judging is a mental going-on for which one needs to be able
to think about green things, or about a thing as a green thing. Now,
what is already used for hypothesis formation is not learned in the
application (conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation) of the hypothesis.
C was already available to form the hypothesis, thus C was not
learned.
Fodor’s conclusion is that all concepts are either innate or
non-rationally (brute-causally, see Fodor, 1981) acquired. This
conclusion is supposed to affect theorizing about learning con-
cepts in all areas of the cognitive sciences, from developmental
psychology to artiﬁcial intelligence research, since it affects the the-
ory choices one has to explain the phenomena of these disciplines.
Consider artiﬁcial intelligence: an important research aim of AI
is to develop systems with human-like intelligence – computer
programs that play chess like grandmasters, robots that move like
biological organisms, and the like. In order to arrive at a theoretical
foundation for such systems, philosophers explore the possibility
and extent of the computational theory of mind (CTM) hypoth-
esis – roughly, that the human mind can be best described as a
system that works like a computer that operates on symbolic rep-
resentations. For a Fodor-type computationalist, the number of
symbols would be predetermined by the system, and so the sym-
bols would be innate. Given the additional constraint that each
symbol of such a computational mind equals one concept, one
has arrived at the point where Fodor’s challenge and the compu-
tationalist program tie in. Landy and Goldstone (2005) describe
such conceptions of CTM as being essentially linked to the idea
that a ﬁxed store of primitive, basic symbols is sufﬁcient for suc-
cessful cognition, and continue by saying that this classical version
of CTM “entails a ﬁxed set of primitives, or at least demands that
any alterations to the primitive set are not cognitively interesting
acts” (Landy and Goldstone, 2005, p. 346). Thus, we have char-
acterized one stance toward Fodor’s challenge, the ﬁxed-features
approach: it accepts the conclusion of Fodor’s challenge, embraces
the radical Concept Nativism that it entails, and denies any trans-
formational effect on the cognitive system that would count as
learning a new primitive concept.
By challenging the sufﬁciency of a ﬁxed set of symbols for
explaining human cognition, and by denying that changes to prim-
itive symbols are not cognitively interesting, Landy and Goldstone
set out their alternative to the Fodorian position and by that give
us the second theory that we will presently take into account as
a reply to Fodor’s challenge. They want to argue for the creation
of cognitive symbols from perceptual materials, and they want
to argue for the possibility of manipulating “systems of high-
level categories” (Landy and Goldstone, 2005, p. 346) to better
ﬁt the demands of the cogniser. The question motivating the
present investigation thus is: Can Goldstone’s theory of percep-
tual learning, and especially Landy and Goldstone’s stance against
ﬁxed-feature languages, stand against Fodor’s challenge and the
acceptance of the ﬁxed-feature approach, and can it give a mecha-
nistically and computationally credible account of human concept
learning?
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AS A REPLY TO FODOR’S
CHALLENGE
The question before us is whether it is possible to enrich a symbol
system through the manipulation or introduction of perceptual
information, or perceptual symbols. Learning features, like other
forms of concept learning, can in an important sense be seen
to hinge on the possibility of arriving at thoughts one was not
able to hold or express before, and thus on having an alterna-
tive to Fodor’s innateness conclusion by ways of providing an
alternative empirical model for concept learning (rejecting the
premise that hypothesis formation and testing is the only empiri-
cally available model for concept learning). The Fodorian CTM
perspective, on Landy and Goldstone’s (2005) account, denies
this possibility, whereas several recent contributors to the debate
have tried to develop models that support an afﬁrmative answer.
One main inspiration for this project comes from Gibson’s (1963)
theory of perceptual learning. A second major theoretical devel-
opment was initiated by the work of Philippe Schyns on feature
creation through experience with stimuli (Schyns and Murphy,
1991, 1994; Schyns and Rodet, 1997), leading up to the uniﬁed
account of Schyns et al. (1998). The idea that the learning of a
novel vocabulary of features yields new categorizations, which will
be introduced below as a part of Landy and Goldstone’s (2005)
account, is rooted in the groundbreaking work of Schyns and his
colleagues.
With their proposal, Landy and Goldstone mainly challenge
Fodor’s assumption that the primary use of concepts is in forming
thoughts, as opposed to using concepts in dealing with the world
via reacting on (sensory) inputs and acting in it/producing (behav-
ioral) outputs. Grounding concept use and concept learning in
perception does however not preclude the use of new perceptual
concepts in higher cognitive activities – this is an important point
made by Landy and Goldstone, e.g., in their discussion of changes
in scientiﬁc reasoning through perceptual changes1. It is worth
dwelling on this aspect of Goldstone’s theory before turning to the
core of Landy and Goldstone’s (2005) proposal. Goldstone sees the
possibility of what he calls perceptual learning, following Gibson
(1963):
Any relatively permanent and consistent change in the per-
ception of a stimulus array, following practice or experience
with this array, will be considered as perceptual learning.
(Gibson, 1963, p. 29)
On this deﬁnition, perceptual learning is a sensory as well as a cog-
nitive process: the changes in focus, or attentional center, to give
two examples, in seeing something are at the same time changes
in the categories pertaining to the perceived object. The repeated
sensory contact with a certain class of objects will bring about a
change in the way one thinks about these objects, which will in
turn inﬂuence its perception, i.e., the sensory processes.
Goldstone explicitly wants to trace the ties between these per-
ceptual changes and the possible conceptual changes that accom-
pany them. He holds that one traditionally neglected aspect of the
relation between perception and conception is the inﬂuence that
1Landy and Goldstone (2005) discuss changes in ontology, cognitive properties
of groups of scientists, and changes in scientiﬁc practice through new perceptual
capacities as cases in point.
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the conceptual systemhas onperception. In categorical perception,
the learned categories inﬂuence the performance in perceptual
tasks. Especially in the sciences, there are multiple examples for
this. Mathematicians can name several properties of a function
just by looking at its graph. Similarly, after studying the geologi-
cal categories and training to differentiate various stone samples,
geologists have a sharper grasp of the differences between stone
types and are able to name them much faster than any layperson
could (Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone and Hendrickson, 2010; Gold-
stone et al., 2012). This is also the second point Goldstone and
Barsalou (1998) stress:
(. . .) perception’s usefulness in grounding concepts comes
from several sources. First, perception provides a wealth of
information to guide conceptualization. Second, perceptual
processes themselves can change as a result of concept devel-
opment and use. Third, many of the constraints manifested
by our perceptual systems are also found in our conceptual
systems. (Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998, p. 232)
The ﬁrst statement of this quote, that our perception can be a
source of information for our conceptual system, does not sound
very controversial since it is not very informative and speciﬁc
in itself. In what way does perception inform conception? Even
on Fodor’s account, perception informs conception in so far as
perceiving an object x can cause the triggering of the accom-
panying concept X. For Goldstone, and especially for Barsalou
(1999), there needs to be a more detailed description of the way
in which perceptual information touches upon our concepts; a
description which probably even does away with the distinction
between perception and conception. The second point has bearing
on the present question in so far as it is the converse of the claim
that Landy and Goldstone (2005) put forward to challenge Fodor:
if both of these directions of inﬂuence were part of the actual
workings of the human mind, then the strongly computationalist
position would either lose a lot of its plausibility, or would have
to be reformulated to accommodate these interrelations. Such an
accommodation would however run against the self-proclaimed
Rationalist position that Fodor adopts. Finally, the third point is
especially important for Barsalou’s (1999) project, but beyond the
scope of the current investigation.
With these preliminaries set out, let’s see how they form a frame
for Landy and Goldstone’s (2005) answer regarding Fodor’s chal-
lenge.A short characterization of themain aims of argumentation,
with references to extended presentations and discussions of these
points, can be put as follows:
1. In learning about thingswe donot already understand,our cog-
nitive system constructs specialized variable-feature languages
that deal with these novel things (cf. Schyns and Murphy, 1991,
1994; Schyns and Rodet, 1997; Quinn et al., 2006).
2. The vocabulary of these languages consists of stimuli that we
perceptually pick up and group as belonging to features, or
feature dimensions (Schyns et al., 1998).
3. New features can be learned by applying the grouping mech-
anisms of unitization and differentiation, as the main players
among other perceptual mechanisms (Goldstone, 1998, 2003;
Goldstone and Landy, 2010).
It is generally assumed that concepts are the tools for, or the com-
ponents of, thought. Thus, they are rather highly developed parts
of our mental lives – conceptual thought is at the upper end of
the scale of cognitive activity. Many things that we think about are
very speciﬁc to a problem domain, like choosing a move in a chess
game, while others are central to many modern human activities,
like decidingwhichway to go to reach the nearest restaurant. Keep-
ingwith the computational tradition in the study of cognition, one
can speak of different “vocabularies”or symbol stores for different
tasks, with some being used for a more diverse range of activities
than others.
Landy and Goldstone (2005) frame the debate as pertaining to
languages of cognitive systems, which is not an uncommon level
of discussion, given that Computationalism treats cognition as
symbol-manipulation, and a number of symbols, combined with
operations over these symbols, can with some right be called a
“language.”In the context of this paper, I propose to call such a lan-
guage a computational language (LanguageC), to highlight that the
sense of “language” is somewhat restricted as compared to a spo-
ken language. Computationalists like Newell and Simon (1976) or
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981, 1988) favor a ﬁxed LanguageC, whose
symbols are inherent in the cognitive system, and sufﬁcient for
any kind of cognitive activity within that system – there is no
need to import new symbols, since the given stock is supposed to
express any proposition that the system would need to process.
Biederman’s (1987) geon model is another example for such a
ﬁxed LanguageC, with the added twist that he attempts to posit
perceptual representations – representations of basic geometrical
forms – as a part of the innate stock of symbols.
To counter this model, Landy and Goldstone present what they
call a “variable-feature language” (Landy and Goldstone, 2005,
p. 347): a LanguageC that can be enriched with new primitive
symbols, if new perceptual tasks require this. In Landy and Gold-
stone (2005), they characterize these enrichments as additions to
particular sets of symbols, constrained by the category, or task,
they are used for. In this, they follow Schyns and Murphy’s (1991,
1994) major contribution to feature-based approaches to concept
learning2. This leads to changes in highly specialized vocabularies,
and need not necessarily affect the foundations of the LanguageC.
Landy and Goldstone talk of special-purpose LanguagesC and
general-purpose LanguagesC in the cognitive system. While the
latter are not excluded by Landy and Goldstone to be innate,
given that they are ubiquitous in the most basic cognitive func-
tions, the former need to be learned on their account. This is
because the tasks that they are needed for are highly specialized
in one way or another: examples that their paper discusses are
ﬁne perceptual discriminations such as discriminating brightness
and saturation, and scientiﬁc theorizing and theory construction.
Landy and Goldstone (2005, p. 348) compare the cognitive sym-
bol system to LEGO blocks: some objects can only be constructed
in a very cumbersome manner if only using the standard blocks
(think of sails for a pirate’s ship), so adding LEGO sails to their
2I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out tome. The functional-
ity principle, that functional demands shape the perceptual processes of categorizing
new stimuli and forming new featural discriminations, from Schyns and Murphy
(1994), has been a cornerstone of recent work in this area.
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repertoire facilitates that speciﬁc kind of building process. The
disadvantage of these special parts, however, is that they cannot
serve for much else except their originally intended function. This,
again, echoes the constraints on special-purpose LanguagesC: the
concept “color saturation” only has a very limited set of tasks for
which it is needed, whereas the concept “not” has a scope that’s
equivalent to the generic LEGO blocks.
Now, in terms of the mechanisms of learning, Landy and Gold-
stone’s theory’s main component is the addition of a cognitive
device at the interface of perception and conception, which slowly
builds “cognitive symbols” out of perceptual stimuli. By adding
these new symbols to the symbolic building blocks of thought,
this device is the agent of concept learning and conceptual change.
The main operations in this system are unitization and differen-
tiation, two mechanisms which either unite previously separated
conceptual elements, or split a vaguely bounded element class into
ﬁner groupings. In my present investigation, I will focus on these
two mechanisms, since they are central to the argument by Landy
and Goldstone (2005). When linking their theories with other,
related work in the ﬁeld, like in Goldstone et al. (2011), or Gold-
stone and Landy (2010), they also discuss other ways of learning.
These include processes that Fodor would classify as brute-causal
acquisition rather than genuine learning, which raises some ques-
tions I can only hint at in this investigation. Nevertheless, I will
introduce these mechanisms later on.
Unitization can be described as a process of grouping sev-
eral previously independent categories under one heading: “When
elements co-vary together and their co-occurrence predicts an
important categorization, the elements tend to beunitized”(Landy
and Goldstone, 2005, p. 350). Here is an example of a process of
unitization learning: suppose you learn what a cup is by seeing
various different cups and not-quite-cuplike objects. Something
qualiﬁes as a cup if it consists of a cylindrical container and a
handle to the side of the container. The contrast class of cuplike
objects consists of other conﬁgurations of containers and handles,
like a handle spanning the top or the bottom of the container (the
former looking a bit like a bucket), or with a handle only connect-
ing with the container at one point (looking like a horn attached
to the cylinder), or even just unconnected handles and containers.
The rules of unitization would incline you to unite the two feat-
ural elements (cylinder and handle) into a token of the concept if
and only if they are in the right spatial conﬁguration (handle on
the side, both parts properly connected). Unitization allows you
to conceive of the two parts as one object, and with that also to
keep unﬁtting combinations, which do not satisfy the perceptual
constraints, out of the class of cups.
It may be necessary to distinguish two kinds of uniting learning
cases: associative chunking and perceptual unitization 3. Asso-
ciative chunking is the process through which two elements that
co-occur regularly become associated: if one is accustomed to get-
ting a glass of water with an ordered cup of coffee, then being
served just a cup of coffee will create the expectation of a glass of
water that has to follow: “drinking coffee” as an activity-concept
has these two elements.
3The distinction was pointed out to me by Robert Goldstone.
Let me consider a case in which two feature dimensions are
reliably correlated so that the occurrence of either one is a reliable
sign of the occurrence of the higher-order phenomenon. Would
such a case be more aptly described as unitzation or as associative
chunking?
Suppose that ﬁre ﬁghters always take big red vehicles that sound
off a siren alternating between the ﬁrst and the fourth tone of a
scale (say C and F), and that all other emergency sirens use a differ-
ent interval, say the prime and the ﬁfth (C and G). Upon learning
about the visual properties of ﬁre engines, one might form a con-
cept “ﬁre engine” that is related to big red vehicles. Having also
learned that the peculiar siren sound of the prime and the fourth is
the ﬁre ﬁghter siren (having formed a concept “ﬁre ﬁghter siren”),
one has formed the basis for putting together those two stimuli as
the two most reliable signs for the presence of a ﬁre engine. Thus,
either of the stimuli can be used to trigger the concept“ﬁre engine,”
despite the lack of the other.While more elaborate than the coffee-
and-water case, fromGoldstone’s perspective this would still count
as chunking, since the co-occurrence is not based on spatial, but on
causal and temporal contiguity, which supports the formation of
two separate feature elements that later get a common “heading”
“ﬁre engine.”
The difference between unitization and chunking can be made
clearer by another example, this time adapted from Landy and
Goldstone (2005, p. 352): in the same way that a photograph of
a group of people is a combination of pictures of the individu-
als, a unitized concept is a combination of features that stand in
certain cognitively interesting, complex relations – possibly with
spatial conﬁguration as the main combinatorial criterion (again,
as in the photograph case). In light of the perceptual constraints on
unitization, which are the main point of difference to associative
chunking, it would be more prudent to not expect unitization over
different sense modalities such as visual and sound perception (as
in the ﬁre engine example) – at least until robust experimental
data supports this idea.
The second mechanism for concept learning is dimension dif-
ferentiation, “by which dimensions that are originally psycholog-
ically fused together become separated and isolated” (Goldstone,
2003, p. 249). Especially in differentiating dimensions, perceptual
constraints inﬂuence the process: while it is easy for adult per-
ceivers to separate the properties“size”and“brightness,” it is much
more difﬁcult for the non-specialist to separate other fused dimen-
sions such as brightness and hue. Differentiation might also be at
work in separating non-dimension features, as in the ﬁre engine
example above. Suppose one never has paid much attention to
siren sounds, and so has never noticed the difference between the
ﬁre ﬁghters’ siren and all other sirens – one has one single con-
cept “emergency siren.” Upon learning about the tonal difference
between the two intervals, probably in a music class, one might
start noticing the difference, and thus differentiate one’s concept
into “fourth interval siren” and“ﬁfth interval siren,” and then even
relate these to the appropriate kinds of emergencies (“there’s been
a robbery next door, I’m quite sure that I’ll soon hear the ﬁfth
interval police siren”).
To make the differences between the perceptual learning per-
spective and classical computationalism clearer, here is another
rephrasing with an example. For the ﬁxed feature approach, new
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mental representations are new combinations of previously avail-
able primitive elements.Associative chunking, as in“glass of water”
and “cup of coffee” as components of the concept “things that I
drink when having coffee,” requires the availability of the com-
ponents that are combined. In the variable-feature approach, new
representations need not necessarily be primitive elements, or psy-
chologically pre-available elements. Rather, they can be stimulus
elements with “no parsing in terms of psychological primitives”
(Landy and Goldstone, 2005, p. 350) – so, what Landy and Gold-
stone want to argue for is the import of perceptual tokens into
the cognitive system. As with LEGO blocks, constructing the con-
cept “cup” from perception is like designing a LEGO cup, with
the restrictions that this brings to the use of the concept (you can
mainly use the cup to use it as a cup, and not to, e.g., build a LEGO
house from LEGO cups).
One already alluded to example comes from Burns and Shepp’s
(1988) study on color vision. Their main idea is that the three
deﬁning features of any given color – its brightness (value), satu-
ration (chroma), and hue – are difﬁcult to selectively attend to for
an untrained observer since color perception is the perception of
quite holistic stimuli. If this were the case, then one would expect
that test subjects would have difﬁculty separating these dimen-
sions when comparing a range of samples. This is just what their
experiments demonstrated. In their study, Burns and Shepp also
found that differentiating brightness and saturation is easier for
trained individuals, such as artists. Landy and Goldstone take this
as evidence for the creation of new feature detectors: if there was
only one detector for “color” before the training, and the subjects
were able to differentiate the brightness and saturation of a range
of colors after their training, then the perceptual task must have
been the cause for feature learning, and for the creation of new
perceptual, discriminatory capacities. And surely, if a person did
not know the difference between the brightness and the saturation
of a color before, and could make a discriminatory judgment after
the study, then a new concept has been learned.
A ﬁnal, important aspect of Goldstone’s proposal is that his and
his colleagues’ studies do not rely on predetermined, ﬁxed stimuli
sets, but on totally novel ones that often cannot readily be parsed
into already known structural elements. An example can be found
in Schyns and Murphy’s (1994)“Martian rocks” studies. The study
employed various black blobs with several kinds of round or pro-
late appendices, without any indication of possible fragments, or
parts of the whole object.
In their argument for using such alternative materials, Schyns
et al. (1998) express that they want to exclude the possibility of
using known categories in their experimental tasks, and that they
want to get a better understanding of the ways in which totally
new categories are learned. If a shape is almost certain to not rep-
resent any possibly innate, fundamental shape primitive, then it
should be very likely that learning to pick out that shape is a case
of learning something new.
With alternative materials, many different interpretations are
possible, there are multiple features that could be encoded, and the
analog format (as opposed to the digital signs one alsoﬁnds inﬁxed
feature experiments) make it possible to study something akin to
real-life concept learning, where the interesting or learn-worthy
features also are not as plainly recognizable.
With this picture of Landy and Goldstone’s (2005) reply to
Fodor’s challenge in mind, let me now confront the question if
their proposal can stand up to the challenge.
CONCEPT LEARNING OR CONCEPTUAL CHANGE?
Given that the perceptual learning approach can do the things
described above, does it actually answer Fodor’s Challenge for
concept learning? I want to argue that it doesn’t, because of
two problems. Goldstone and colleagues have thus far left deci-
sive questions pertaining to the central elements of their account,
namely the details of the integration of perceptual symbols into
the representational system, and the role of features and stimuli in
that process, unanswered.
First and foremost, it is not clear whether the model provides
prospects for concept learning at all. Onemight agree that the phe-
nomena of unitization and differentiation are a form of learning,
since they are mechanisms of restructuring previously available
categories, and thereby they are means of grouping information in
new ways that might lead to new beliefs. Consider somebody who
ﬁnds out that two animals which she knew to be dogs belonged
to two different breeds, say Labrador Retrievers and Dalmatians.
This could clearly count as learning something one had not previ-
ously understood. But does it really count as introducing two new
“psychological primitives”? An alternative view along ﬁxed-feature
lines would be to grant that “Labrador Retriever” and“Dalmatian”
are indeed new, but only as names for two objects that had already
been processed in thought in a different way, say as p and q (the
letters standing for the symbols standing for the individual dog
tokens). So,what has been addedwere not new symbols, but rather
new labels for old symbols, or new beliefs about these symbols, as
in “p is a token of ‘Labrador Retriever’.”
It has been suggested to me to look at a more perceptually
taxing kind of differentiation process, since this might support
Landy and Goldstone’s position. Suppose that, in a psychological
experiment, a subject is rewarded for identifying tokens of pacman
shapes with a 92˚ “mouth” angle, and not rewarded if she chooses
pacman shapeswith a 90˚“mouth”angle.Wouldn’t onewant to say
that learning to appropriately keep those two shapes apart counts
as learning a new concept? While the example is intriguing, and
representative for a class of psychological experiments on catego-
rization, I would argue that it does not count as a case of learning
a new concept of, say, “92˚ pacman.” Since the goal of the sub-
ject lies in getting the reward, it seems more appropriate to speak
of the concept “choice that gets me a reward” and the perceptual
input that is related to a token of the concept – a choice of a given
answer, say “A” or “B” (if “A” and “B” stand for the answers related
to the respective 92˚/90˚ pacman). If one carries this thought fur-
ther, the discriminatory input does not become involved in the
conceptual content of the concept that is applied in the task – a
92˚ pacman is not a token of “choice that gets me the reward,”
but it is a prompt to apply the concept by acting in a certain way.
This is not to say that ﬁne perceptual discriminations can never
become conceptually relevant, or the topic of conceptual develop-
ment: examples like Smith and Kemler’s (1978) study of changes
in the integrality of dimensions such as color and shape surely
count as evidence to the contrary. The theoretical status of these
developmental changes, however, is exactly the topic of this paper,
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even though I presently cannot go into a detailed treatment of the
developmental literature for lack of space.
Returning to the dog example, the tricky question for the ﬁxed-
feature computationalist at this point, therefore, is not whether
the new dog breeds were learned, but rather how the symbol, the
name, and the object that the symbol and the name denote are
causally related. This is a thorny question for philosophers like
Fodor (1998), as they have to defend a very speciﬁc type of meta-
physical theory of causation to make their analysis stick (see, e.g.,
Cowie, 1998 for discussion). Perceptual learning would evade this
metaphysical question (“How can an innate symbol refer to any-
thing that was encountered perceptually?”), but at the price of
creating a psychological one (“How is it possible to import new
cognitive symbols from perceptual origins into a LanguageC?”),
which will create the second worry that is identiﬁed further below.
At this point, one might be tempted to postulate that there are
several kinds of learning: in one kind of learning experience, some
genuinely new primitive psychological token (be it a new feature,
or symbol, or whatever kind of enrichment one might be inter-
ested in) is incorporated into the cognitive system. A case in point
would be turning a perceptual stimulus into a cognitively usable
symbol that canbeused for category judgments, forming thoughts,
or other conceptual tasks. Here, something that has not been part
of the LanguageC would be transferred into that same language.
Fodor’s challenge is concerned with this kind of learning.
In another kind of learning experience, the available pieces
of information get re-ordered, linked to other bits of informa-
tion, or get categorized in a ﬁner raster. Strictly speaking, nothing
new enters the store of cognitive symbols, but the differentiation
between different kinds of already available symbols will be ﬁner,
or coarser, depending on the type of change. The question remains
if Landy and Goldstone would be happy with “only” providing a
model for the second type of learning, since the aim of their article,
in their own words, clearly was to give a model for the ﬁrst type:
our alternative to ﬁxed-primitive languages involves not giv-
ing up computationalism, but enriching it with mechanisms
which allow the construction of new psychological primitives
that are not just combinations of other known categories.
(Landy and Goldstone, 2005, p. 347)
On one interpretation of the perceptual learning approach, the
main processes of unitization and differentiation seem to fail
to introduce new concepts, since they only operate on existing
concepts, which are modiﬁed to be either more general or more
speciﬁc regarding certain features of a given category.As Landy and
Goldstone (2005) openly state, “feature creation simply involves
alterations to the organization of stimulus elements into features”
(Landy and Goldstone, 2005, p. 349). But a more strict computa-
tionalist, or a Nativist, could easily argue that this process does not
strictly speaking add any new information to the cognitive system,
as, e.g., Fodor (2008) does. Rearranging old concepts, on this view,
cannot be counted as learning, since there is no new information
added, but only a regrouping of old concepts. Like in the dog case
above, there would only be the addition of new labels for objects
that have previously been parts of the LanguageC. If, however, one
wants to object to this analysis, and maintain that unitization and
differentiation mainly work on percepts, then the worries raised
in the next part of this paper will apply.
A variant of Fodor’s hypothesis-testing paradox can be for-
mulated that transfers the point into the feature-based learning
Goldstone endorses: in order to categorize a stimulus as being
evidence for/being a token of a certain psychological feature, one
needs to knowwhat feature that is – inorder toperceive a soundas a
ﬁre ﬁghter siren, one needs to knowwhat a ﬁre ﬁghter siren sounds
like (fourth interval). And to know that, one surely needs a feature
category that is available before having a stimulus to categorize
accordingly. If there is not more to what perceptual learning can
do for our understanding of what concept learning should be, then
it does not have an explanatory advantage to Fodor’s Nativism in
this regard, and need not even be incompatible with his large and
ﬁxed basic vocabulary of the mind – the primitive symbols being
given, while more elaborate concepts might well be composed by
mechanisms like unitization and differentiation.
Gauker (1998) addresses a similar worry concerning Schyns
et al. (1998). Gauker in fact poses a double dilemma to any
“concepts as (composed out of) features” approach. Suppose that
concepts are composed of features, and that learning a concept
involves learning a certain amount of the properties that are associ-
ated with the concept. Learning the concept“bird”might be linked
to associating the concepts “has wings,” “has a beak,” “ﬂying ani-
mal,”or any other combination of attributes, to the concept“bird.”
Yet, this would require these attributes to be developmentallymore
basic than the concept “bird.” How could that be? Gauker sees
only two possibilities, which pose a dilemma for Goldstone. Either
one accepts that there is a developmental hierarchy of features
and concepts. This option is in principle open to anybody, but
has special advantages for ﬁxed-feature theorists. One could pos-
tulate that there are certain primitive features at the basis of the
more elaborated conceptual constructions that are learned in cases
like learning the concept “bird.” These features are already parts
of the cognitive system that did not need to be learned, and so
would form an (in some way) innate basis for our more super-
ordinate concepts. If these features were innate, or pre-speciﬁed,
they would be ﬁxed. As laid out above, Goldstone wants to have
some room for ﬂexible features, so only relying on this option does
not seem to be a viable option, especially since ﬁxed-feature theo-
rists might just postulate a big enough or ﬂexible enough primitive
basis of concepts that could really ground any supposedly percep-
tually learnable concept. The other option is to deny that feature
concepts need to be more primitive than the superordinate con-
cepts – Gauker associates Schyns et al. with this view. The problem
for this view is that it requires an explanation of exactly how“truly
new features are created” (Gauker, 1998, p. 27) – features that do
not have a previous history of, e.g., having been fused with other
features, forming a less differentiated category.
Landy and Goldstone (2005) attempt to answer these kinds of
criticism by pointing out the changes that they have observed in
their studies and in similar studies. They cite evidence that “early
perceptual devices can be systematically and physically altered by
the environment to change their representational capacities” (p.
351) to support the claim that new features can be created. For
example, in simulations by Rumelhart and Zipser (1985), connec-
tionist systems were able to create new detectors for different kinds
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of stimuli in a competitive learning task. But while the evidence
might be supporting this claim, it certainly need not support the
connected claim that such a change in representational capacities
causes changes in the LanguageC, and by this causes the learning
of new features. A ﬁxed feature theorist might be very happy with
the ﬁrst claim, linking it to the activation or triggering of a certain
store of symbols that affects early perceptual devices: environmen-
tal inﬂuences would ﬁrst cause changes in the (already present)
symbolic system, which would in turn result in changes in percep-
tion. The change in representational capacities thus might just be
a change in frequencies of triggering certain symbols. One might
call this a formof learning, since therewould be changes in the per-
ceptual domain, but the corresponding changes in the conceptual
domain – starting to use previously available symbols for hitherto
unperformed perceptual tasks – would not be substantial enough
to warrant the label “concept learning.”
Adding to this point, one can enlist another example of a learn-
ing system that Landy and Goldstone (2005) brieﬂy discuss it in
their, and which they revisit in Goldstone and Landy (2010): the
Pask device4. A Pask device is “an array of electrodes partially
immersed in an aqueous solution of metallic salts” (Landy and
Goldstone, 2005, p. 351) that will physiologically change when
electric currents are applied. Now, changes in electrical conﬁg-
uration in the device come with changes in functionality – the
device will start reacting discriminatively to two kinds of sound
frequencies: a “new ear” for the circuit has been trained while it
got constructed. From Fodor’s perspective, it would however be
a mistake to call this learning. These changes have all the charac-
teristics that brute-causal acquisition of concepts in humans also
has, so by deﬁnition, they do not amount to concept learning.
This issue is independent of the question whether the Pask device
actually is a representational system – if a certain reaction to fre-
quency A counts as representing that frequency. Following Prinz
and Barsalou (2000), I am inclined to regard the Pask device as
a representational system, and in that sense a ﬁtting analogy to
a cognitive system. Focusing on the question whether the Pask
device’s development of an electronic ear is more like knowing the
difference between smoke and steam after being hit on the head or
more like learning from observation about the difference, I sub-
mit that it is decidedly more like the former, and thus not a case
of learning in Fodor’s sense5.
Based on this reasoning, it seems right to focus on unitization
and differentiation as the main players in feature learning when
seen as concept learning,while acknowledging that Fodor’s kind of
brute-causal acquisition – as demonstrated by human analogs to
the Pask device’s “learning”– plays a transformative role in human
cognition that might be seen as enabling concept learning.
4The example of the Pask device has been introduced into the feature creation lit-
erature in the section “Authors’ response” of Schyns et al. (1998), where it is used to
link the ideas of perceptual learning and of emergent properties in learning.
5This investigation invariably leads to the question whether perceptual learning in
humans should count as Fodor-type learning or as brute–causal acquisition. Dis-
cussing this point is beyond the scope of the current paper, but can be developed into
a different argument against the methodological set-up of Fodor’s challenge – the
distinction between brute–causal and rational acquisition might not be as helpful
as Fodor would like it to be, and cases like the Pask device might work in favor of
giving up the distinction altogether.
Up to this point, the perceptual learning approach has not suc-
ceeded in answering Fodor’s challenge, since the alternative ﬁxed-
feature theory has been shown to give equally powerful expla-
nations of phenomena like changes in representational capacity,
while not having the problem of having to explain how new cog-
nitive symbols could be created from perceptual materials. Also,
the perceptual learning approach has not given a full model for the
latter task, and thereby only stands on a partial base of providing
good explanations for the inﬂuence of the conceptual on the per-
ceptual. There is however another set of conceptual problems that
call for a resolution before the perceptual learning approach can
get off the ground and before we can assess whether an inference
to the best explanation would support the ﬁxed-feature approach
or the perceptual learning approach.
THE NOTIONS “FEATURE” AND “STIMULUS”
A second worry that directly follows from the ﬁrst one has to do
with the notion of features and stimuli in concept learning. In
Goldstone’s theory, concepts are (created out of) features; features
are created from stimuli. Stimuli are in a format that is supposedly
compatible to the symbolic vocabularyof cognition.Compatibility
is a decisive criterion here, and can be deﬁned as follows:
Compatibility= (Def.) A set of symbols S is compatible to
a cognitive mechanism M iff inputting S into M yields a
(symbolic) output SO which can be used by further cognitive
mechanisms. A set of symbols S is compatible to a second
set of symbols S2 iff S and S2 can both serve as input for M
individually, and iff symbols from S and S2 in combination
also yield a symbolic output SO which can be used by further
cognitive mechanisms.
Without a fulﬁlled compatibility criterion, it would not be possible
to incorporate the perceptually based symbols into the previously
available and exercised cognitive activities. Speaking in terms of
LanguageC, all symbols need to be combinable to form correct
sentences from them6. Or again in Landy and Goldstone’s (2005)
terms:
the claim that novel perceptual features can be learned sounds
murky, or even mystical, without the clariﬁcation that the
novel features are always drawn from a larger, more expres-
sive, more primitive language embodying the physical and
pre-conceptual constraints on what can be incorporated into
features in the ﬁrst place. (Landy andGoldstone, 2005,p. 348)
What is a stimulus then? In any dictionary of behavioral and cog-
nitive science, one will ﬁnd descriptions of perception in terms of
proximal and distal stimuli. The distal stimulus of a visual expe-
rience might be the tree one sees, whereas the proximal stimulus
would be the light reﬂection arriving at the eyes. At which level
do, e.g., Landy and Goldstone (2005) individuate stimuli? This
question is pertinent to our present investigation since Landy and
Goldstone should address it tomake clearwhere exactly theywould
see the origins of perceptual experiences, and with that the origins
6This point is related, though not identical, to the issue of the compositionality of
thought, raised, e.g., by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 93 | 7
Stöckle-Schobel Perceptual learning approach to concepts
of perceptually based concepts: are they in the world (i.e., distal
stimuli) or are they in sensory activations (i.e., proximal stimuli)?
Just looking at their (Landy and Goldstone, 2005) paper, they
discuss examples of roughly half-moon shaped ﬁgures combined
of ﬁve segments and call these objects stimuli. In another example,
they talk about “pieces of physical information [that are related to,
or] packaged together in the same psychological feature” (p. 349)
and use this as a synonym for “feature.” These are exemplary –
or metaphorical, respectively – descriptions of what features or
stimuli should be, and yet, these are the most concrete mentions
of those terms. A look at earlier renderings of the theory might
help. Schyns et al. (1998) commit themselves to the following
characterization of the meaning of the term “feature”:
The term “feature will refer to any elementary property of
a distal stimulus that is an element of cognition, an atom
of psychological processing. This does not imply that people
are consciously aware of these properties. Instead, features
are identiﬁed by their functional role in cognition; for exam-
ple, they allow new categorizations and perceptions to occur.”
(Schyns et al., 1998, p. 1, original emphasis)
Here, ﬁrst, features are described as“elementary properties”of dis-
tal stimuli. They are also implied to be“elements of cognition,” i.e.,
Schyns et al. (1998) postulate a transition of perceptual properties
into cognitive functions. The second point concerns a property’s
role in cognition: it is supposed to be functional. By this descrip-
tion, Schyns and colleagues want to counter the objection that
some feature of an object might not enter a perceiver’s conscious
awareness and thus should not count as an element of cognition.
While thewording in the quote above suggests a deﬁnition in terms
of distal stimuli, it also alludes to the psychological role of features,
which is even more obvious in Goldstone (2003):
A psychological feature [. . .] is a set of stimulus elements
that are responded to together, as an integrated unit. That
is, a feature is a package of stimulus elements that [. . .]
reﬂects the subjective organization of the whole stimulus into
components. (Goldstone, 2003, p. 242)
So, I suggest we should understand Landy and Goldstone (2005)
as taking proximal stimuli as the larger background language. Still,
there is the unanswered question how these perceptual signals are
transferred into language-like symbols that can be used in the same
cognitive operations as either innate or previously acquired sym-
bols. How are these vocabularies matched to each other? Let me
push the language analogy a little furtherwith an example: suppose
the LanguageC is like English – approximately every English word
corresponds to a mental symbol. Now suppose that the cognitive
vocabulary gets enriched with a number of specialized features
developed from a perceptual task, like learning chess moves. Per-
ceptually learning a chess move, as opposed to learning it from
a written description, might work as follows in the case of the
rook’s permissible movements on the board: straight lines along
the horizontal and the vertical axis, but not on diagonals. The
correct movements can be observed by watching rooks in a large
sample of chess moves, or video clips from chess matches, also
with a variety of token rooks (made from different materials, or
shaped in a variety of ways), and one might even learn how to tell
whether a chess piece is a rook or a queen. The interesting ques-
tion then is: would a thought about a situation in a chess match be
multimodal – would it involve the perceptually learned symbol for
the rook as well as the previously available non-domain-speciﬁc
vocabulary? Let’s take “[]” as a replacement for the perceptual
symbol related to the rook moving one square to the left, just for
this example, and phrase a thought like “If the rook moves one
square to the left, the players will stop playing” multimodally: “If
[], the players will stop playing” (given, e.g., that the result is a
checkmate). Is it possible to infer the consequent of this condi-
tional from being presented with a representation of []?While this
last question might be for further empirical studies to decide, it
already hints at the more general worry about perceptual tokens
of some sort and their role in cognitive operations: given that
originally, a certain cognitive function is performed by a mech-
anism using symbols of a (possibly innate) LanguageC, how can
the mechanism adapt to new symbols being introduced into it
and ﬁlling that cognitive function? That is, how can a perceptual
symbol store and an innately ﬁxed symbol store become com-
patible, as deﬁned above? Landy and Goldstone do not offer a
model for this, and so I conclude that, as it stands, the construc-
tion of variable-feature language has not been sufﬁciently based
on a model of transferring perceptual symbols into conceptual
systems.
Sticking to the notion of features as primarily relevant to build-
ing mental representations, one could bring the theory of feature
detectors into play, as in Barlow (2001). This, speciﬁcally in visual
perception, would be an (obvious) way out of the problem, yet
with the (obvious) problem that the feature detectors would have
to be tuned to some speciﬁc inputs, and then the question arises
again: How did the feature detectors come into being, and how did
they get the tuning they exhibit? Feature detectors are an instance
of (possibly innate) processes that one might use to explain con-
cept learning, under the assumption that concepts need not be
built into a system as long as there are built in processes that will
be able to import concepts into the system. The problem, how-
ever, remains the same: a nativist can always argue that built in
processes need to be tuned to their inputs in some way. In the per-
ceptual learning literature (broadly deﬁned), one can ﬁnd several
references to Gestalt laws (Schyns and Murphy, 1994; Quinn et al.,
2006; Bhatt and Quinn, 2011), and even proposals to explain that
acquiring Gestalt laws is possible through neural network simu-
lations (Gerganov et al., 2007). Yet, how should adherence to a
given Gestalt law, e.g., good continuity, be possible for a cogni-
tive system without having concepts that are able to express the
law and that would help classifying perceptions according to the
principle?
Appealing to maturation, or another form of innateness, would
yield no new variable-feature language in the sense of Landy and
Goldstone (2005), as its large explanatory trump is its indepen-
dence of the speciﬁc type of stimuli the system is confronted
with. A classic example in point of this could be imprinting
in newborn ducks, as discussed by Fodor (1981): any moving
object will trigger the “concept” “mother,” having the duck fol-
lowing the moving object. The important thing is that the duck’s
sensory system is predetermined to follow the closest moving
object.
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If on the other hand the speciﬁc stimuli play a role, or matter
in some sense for the creation of psychological primitives, how do
they inﬂuence the creation of a feature detector?
We seem to have gone the circle back to the original question,
and the appeal to a larger background language of stimuli has
not advanced us very far. Maybe, looking at the problem from a
different perspective, under the heading of “physical information”
will clear things up. After all, Landy and Goldstone (2005), also
refer to the materials from which to get new features as “physical
information” (p. 349).
Now, the task is to disambiguate the notion “physical informa-
tion” and to link it to the question of the proximity of stimuli.
Either, physical information, or a bundle of features, is supposed
to be informationally structured before or in being perceived. This
would require a form of direct realism, or of direct perception: for
example, a given object affords to be perceived as a tree, so we
as perceivers pick up the right kind of information in order to
treat it as a tree. Or, on the other hand, physical information is
the cognitive content that has been extracted from the experience;
this could be something like a representation of a tree. The retina
has registered a certain image, sent it to the visual cortex in one
way or another and there, a representation of the tree is formed,
or accessed, or activated. In line with the above decision to talk of
stimuli in terms of proximal stimuli, it seems sensible to choose
the interpretation of physical information as cognitive content.
This interpretation, however, just skips the interesting question,
which is: “How does a representation of a new object come to be
included in a cognitive system?”, and leaves the ﬁeld open for any
kind of Nativist reply to the effect that the representation was trig-
gered by some process, or that the perceptual stimulus got paired
with an arbitrary symbol from the wealth of symbols in the rep-
resentational mind. To avoid this, any proponent of perceptual
learning has to go the long way and show just how perceptual con-
tent enters cognition and by which means new symbols, or new
bits of a feature-“language,” are added to the system. Landy and
Goldstone do not offer a model for this form of feature learn-
ing, and so I have to conclude that – while it is not conceptually
excluded that such a model is possible – their proposal still has
some way to go before it can pose a fully developed alternative to
their ﬁxed-feature opponents.
CONCLUSION: PERSPECTIVES FOR AN AMENDMENT OF THE
PERCEPTUAL LEARNING APPROACH
To amend the theory, one would need to say more about the
input systems to unitization and differentiation, and be clearer
on the representational format that they are able to operate upon.
Speciﬁcally, the following questions are still unanswered.
How can a cognitive mechanism that was presumably ﬁrst
stocked with innate computational symbols grow to work with
learned perceptual features as input to and vocabulary for its activ-
ity? And is it possible to mix symbols of different origins and
formats (amodal/modal) – to have “multi-lingually” integrated
cognition?
Until the issues raised in this article have been addressed, the
proposal does not deploy its full potential to threaten a ﬁxed-
feature approach à la Fodor: even if both approaches can be
construed as having similar levels of explanatory power, one of
them satisﬁes Fodor’s challenge while the other one does not yet
overturn its empirical premise. The disadvantages that stem from
the problems identiﬁed in this investigation weaken the percep-
tual learning approach’s appeal and thereby put its opponent in
the stronger argumentative position for now.
After this discussion, one might also be tempted to conclude
that the notion of a feature language, ﬂexible, or variable, is mis-
guided as it invariably brings the issue of translation into the
debate. How to translate a stimulus (and which stimulus) into
a mental symbol? Also, it suggests an ordered, or “grammatical”
structure in the non-mental/physical world that is the object of
perception. This is dangerous, because the world as appearing to
us might not actually be best carved into the perceived (natural?)
kinds, but into theoretical kinds that we only perceive through
mediation. One does not see the chemical structure of object
x without being somewhat of a trained chemist, if at all, or at
least it is not clear in the Perceptual Learning approach whether
the interaction between perception and cognition leads to such
depths of theory-ladenness of perception (as in seeing chemical
structure) as opposed to a quick-and-dirty inferential connection
between perceiving certain visual properties of a chemical sam-
ple – e.g., observing a deep green ﬂame when burning a sample of
a chemical powder, and identifying it as copper(II)-sulfate (maybe
a perceptual–cognitive process), as well as the sample’s being a
salt (an inference from that observation). In making the distinc-
tion between perceptual–cognitive and inferential, the adherence
of a given process to perceptual constraints might indicate that
the process is of the former type, whereas observations follow-
ing theoretical, or “conceptual,” rules can be properly classiﬁed
as the latter7. Still, the distinction is not always a clearly cut
one.
This does not just touch upon Landy and Goldstone’s (2005)
proposal, but more generally on their still dominating opponents:
if the language metaphor does not work for features, as one might
conclude from the problems raised in the previous section, then
why should one be inclined to see the strong analogy between
computers – symbol crunchers – and human minds with brains
and nervous systems underlying them (in one way or another)
as necessary? Perhaps the mind only becomes symbolic by start-
ing to use symbols, but does not reﬂect this symbol-mindedness
in the elements of cognition. Dissociating materials, or vehicles of
thought, on the one hand, and thought contents on the other hand,
might be a prudent move until a clearer picture of the connections
between vehicles and contents is available.
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